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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by virtue of § 78-2a-3(e), U.C.A. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, 
STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
1. Issue: Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that the City has 
the power and authority to reduce the penalty portion of § 41-6-12, U.C.A., from a Class 
C misdemeanor to an Infraction. 
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Standard of Review: This issue is a question of law and is therefore reviewed for 
correctness. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994) (issue of waiver of 
constitutional rights is reviewed for correctness); State v. McDonald, 922 P.2d 776, 781 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved at the end of oral argument on the 
Defendant's/Appellant's Motion for Jury Trial (R. 74.), and the Defendant/Appellant 
timely filed on July 16, 1996, her Notice of Appeal. (R. 55.) 
2. Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the City to 
amend its initial Information where the trial court failed to follow and hold the City to the 
provisions of Rule 4(d), Utah R. Cr. P., and where such amendment prejudiced Caree's 
right to a trial by jury. 
Standard of Review: This is an abuse of discretion issue and is reviewed for 
reasonableness. See State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 714 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied, 
857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised after oral argument on the 
Defendant's/Appellant's Motion for Jury Trial, (R. 5-6.) and the Defendant/Appellant 
timely filed on July 16, 1996, her Notice of Appeal. (R. 74.) 
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3. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in imposing a fine which substantially 
exceeds the Uniform Fine/Bail Schedule when no aggravating circumstances were present 
and the trial court made no findings which would reasonably justify such enhancement of 
the basic fine set forth by the Schedule. 
Standard of Review: This issue is a matter of discretion and is reviewed under an 
abuse of discretion standard, except where the court's ruling is based upon a conclusion 
of law, and then it is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Russell 791 P. 2d 188,192 
(Utah 1990). 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised when the Defendant/Appellant timely 
filed on July 16, 1996, her Notice of Appeal. (R. 74.) 
4. Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in (1) denying a hearing on 
Caree's Motion for Jury Trial on a date prior to the trial, and (2) denying her a 
continuance after denying her Motion where such denial substantially prejudiced her. 
Standard of Review: This issue is a matter of discretion and is reviewed under an 
abuse of discretion standard, except where the court's ruling is based upon a conclusion 
of law, and then it is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Russell 791 P. 2d 188,192 
(Utah 1990). 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised when the Defendant/Appellant timely 
filed on July 16, 1996, her Notice of Appeal. (R. 74.) 
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5. Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a penalty on 
Caree that substantially exceeds the Uniform Fine/Bail schedule without finding any 
aggravating factors because such abuse has a chilling effect on Caree's right to trial and 
obviously prejudiced her. 
Standard of Review: This issue is a matter of discretion and is reviewed under an 
abuse of discretion standard, except where the court's ruling is based upon a conclusion 
of law, and then it is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Russell, 791 P. 2d 188, 192 
(Utah 1990). 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised when the Defendant/Appellant timely 
filed on July 16, 1996, her Notice of Appeal. (R. 74.) 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 (in part): 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. . . A jury 
in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded, (emphasis added). 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 12 (in part): 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, . . . [and] to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury . . . (emphasis added). 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT VII: 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by 
a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than 
according to the rules of the common law. 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, § 41-6-12 (pertinent part): 
(1) A violation of any provision of this chapter is a class C misdemeanor, 
unless otherwise provided. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, § 41-6-16 (pertinent part): 
The provisions of this chapter are applicable and uniform throughout this 
state and in all of its political subdivisions and municipalities. A local authority 
may not enact or enforce any rule or ordinance in conflict with the provisions 
of this chapter. . . 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, § 41-6-46 (pertinent part): 
(1) A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed greater than is 
reasonable and prudent under the existing conditions,. . . 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, § 76-3-102: 
Offenses are designated as felonies, misdemeanors, or infractions. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, §76-3-105. 
(1) Infractions are not classified. 
(2) Any offense which is an infraction within this code is expressly designated 
and any offense define outside this code which is not designated as a felony or 
misdemeanor and for which no penalty is specified is an infraction. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, § 77-1-6 (pertinent part): 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district where 
the offense is alleged to have been committed; 
(2) In addition: 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a plea of 
guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by jury has been 
waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a magistrate. 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, § 78-21-1: 
In actions for the recovery of specific real or personal property, with or 
without damages, or for money claimed as due upon contract or as damages for 
breach of contract, or for injuries, an issue of fact may be tried by a jury, 
unless a jury trial is waived or a reference is ordered. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, RULE 4(d) (pertinent part): 
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be prosecuted by 
indictment or information sworn to by a person having reason to believe the 
offense has been committed. 
(d) The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended at 
any time before verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the 
substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. . . . 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, RULE 17 (pertinent part): 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel. . . . 
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a 
jury in open court with the approval of the court and the consent of the 
prosecution. 
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant 
makes written demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders 
otherwise. No jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 38 (pertinent part): 
(a) Right preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by the 
constitution or as given by statute shall be preserved to the parties. 
(b) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of 
right by a jury by paying the statutory jury fee. . . 
(d) . . . A demand for trial by jury made as herein provided may not be 
withdrawn without the consent of the parties. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. The Plaintiff/Appellee, West Valley City ("City"), a political subdivision of the 
State of Utah, initiated this action pursuant to § 41-6-46, U.C.A., against the 
Defendant/Appellant Caree F. McDonald ("Caree") by issuing a summons and citation to 
her for allegedly speeding on January 6, 1996, in West Valley City, Utah. (R. 1.) Caree 
was specifically charged with driving at a speed of 51 miles per hour in a 40 mile per 
hour speed zone, or 11 MPH over the posted speed limit. (R. 1,5.) 
2. Pursuant to § 41-6-12, U.C.A., the penalty for violating § 41-6-46, U.C.A., is a 
Class C Misdemeanor. See Addendum 7; (R. 5.) 
3. The Uniform Fine/Bail Schedule provides for a $50.00 fine when the offender is 
guilty of speeding 11-15 miles per hour in excess of the speed limit. See Addendum 4. 
4. The City relied on Photo Radar as the sole means of determining the speed of 
Caree's vehicle. (R. 6.) 
5. Caree resides in West Valley City, Utah, and has no record of any other traffic 
violations within the past five years. (R. 5.) 
6. After a pre-trial conference, a trial was set for June 20, 1996. (R. 24.) 
7. On May 22, 1996, Caree made her demand for a jury trial. (R. 25.) 
8. On June 7, 1996, the City's Prosecutor filed an amended Information in which 
the penalty was reduced from a Class C Misdemeanor to an Infraction. (R. 32.) 
9. On June 13, 1996, the trial court informed Caree that she would not be entitled to 
a jury trial since the City, through its Prosecutor, had amended the Information and had 
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reduced the penalty from a Class C Misdemeanor to an Infraction. (R. 34.) 
10. On the same day, June 13, 1996, Caree filed a Motion for Jury Trial and 
requested "Expedited Disposition" and that the trial court set a hearing prior to the day of 
trial. (R. 36-42.) Notwithstanding Caree's request, the trial court refused to set a hearing 
on her Motion for Jury Trial. 
11. On June 20, 1996, the date set for trial, the trial court denied Caree's Motion for 
Jury Trial. (R. 74.)1 The trial court also denied Caree's Motion for Continuance, which 
was orally made to the trial court immediately upon the trial court's denial of a jury trial. 
(R. 34.) 
12. The trial court forced Caree to proceed with a bench trial. (R. 75.) Caree, upon 
observing the hostile and brusque demeanor of the trial judge, desired to consider the 
Prosecutor's plea offer. (R. 74.) However, the Prosecutor unexpectedly informed Caree 
and the trial court that the plea offer had expired the day prior to trial and prior to the 
hearing on Caree's request for a jury trial. (R. 74.) Thus, the plea offer was withdrawn. 
(R. 74.) 
13. The trial court proceeded with a bench trial and found Caree guilty of speeding 
as charged. (R. 76.) 
1
 The trial court characterized its own action as merely approving the City's action in amending the 
Information to an Infraction. (R. 75.) However, the trial court's statement that "My ruling isn't denying your 
client a jury trial," strains the court's credibility. (R. 75.) 
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14. The trial court then imposed, without finding any aggravating circumstances, a 
fine amount of $60.00, an amount that exceeds by 20% the Uniform Fine/Bail Schedule 
and which exceeds the amount that Caree could have paid prior to the trial without 
considering any plea offer. (R. 44, 77.); Addendum 4. In addition, the trial court 
imposed a time and cost requirement for Caree to attend a Safety Driver's School at an 
additional cost of $30.00. (R. 44-45, 47, 77.) The trial court failed to find any 
aggravating circumstances. (R. 76-75.) In fact, Caree stated to the trial court that she had 
no other traffic violations within the past five years. (R. 76.) 
15. On July 15, 1996, Caree filed her Notice of Appeal, her Motion for Stay of 
Fine, and her Application for Certificate of Probable Cause. (R. 48-58.) On 
August 6, 1996, at the conclusion of oral argument before the Honorable 
Judith S.H. Atherton, the trial court granted Caree's Motion for Stay of Fine. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that the City has the power and 
authority to reduce the penalty portion of § 41-6-12, U.C.A., from a Class C misdemeanor 
to an Infraction. Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-16, U.C.A., expressly prohibits the City 
from enacting or enforcing an ordinance or rule that is inconsistent with the provisions of 
Chapter 6, Title 41. Hence, the City, nor its agent (i.e., the City's Prosecutor), had no 
authority to change the penalty for speeding from a Class C Misdemeanor to an 
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Infraction. 
II. The trial court also impermissibly permitted the City to amend its Information 
without regard to Rule 4(d), Utah R. Cr. P., and without considering that such 
amendment denied Caree her substantial right to a trial by jury. 
III. Even if, arguendo, the City could reduce the penalty for speeding from a Class 
C misdemeanor to an Infraction, the trial court erred in denying Caree a trial by jury 
because Utah's Constitution guarantees to Caree her right to a trial by jury. Whereas 
Utah's Constitution places no limits on Caree's right to trial by jury, Utah Code 
Annotated § 77-l-6(2)(e) impermissibly limits Caree's right to a trial by jury where the 
penalty is an Infraction. However, the Constitution does not carve out a classification for 
an "infraction" that is separate from "criminal" or "civil." Since the Constitution clearly 
grants all "criminal" and all "civil" actions the right to trial by jury, Utah Code Annotated 
§ 77-l-6(2)(e) is without constitutional support. 
IV. The trial abused its discretion in not setting a hearing on Caree's Motion for 
Jury Trial on a date prior to the date of trial and in not granting a continuance after 
denying Caree's Motion for Jury Trial because the burden on the trial court was slight, if 
any, and substantially prejudiced Caree. 
V. The trial court, without finding any aggravating circumstances, abused its 
discretion by imposing a fine that is substantially greater than would have been imposed 
if Caree had simply plead guilty. The trial court's actions cast a disturbing chill over a 
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defendant's right to trial In this instance, the trial court, in effect, penalized Caree 
simply because she elected to have a trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that the City has the power 
and authority to reduce the penalty portion of $ 41-6-12, U.C.A.% from a Class C 
misdemeanor to an Infraction, 
Caree was charged by the City with speeding pursuant to the State's speeding 
statute, § 41-6-46, U.C.A. (R. 1.) The penalty for such violation is governed by 
§41-6-12, U.C.A., which states in part: 
(1) A violation of any provision of this chapter is a class C 
misdemeanor, unless otherwise provided. 
§41-6-12, U. CA. 
The City acknowledged that the penalty for speeding is a Class C misdemeanor 
when it filed its Information on April 15, 1996. Addendum 7; (R. 5.) The Information 
states in part: 
Count 1: SPEEDING, a Class "C" misdemeanor, § 41-6-46, U.C.A. 
1953, as amended, by operating a motor vehicle... 
Addendum 7; (R. 5.) 
The City's Information unequivocally declared the penalty for Caree's alleged 
violation to be a Class "C" misdemeanor. The Information also expressly referenced 
§ 41-6-46, U.C.A., for its authority. 
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Pursuant to Rule 17(d), Utah R. Cr. P., Caree filed her jury demand, on 
May 23, 1996. The City, without the trial court's permission, filed its Amended 
Information on June 7, 1997.2 See Addendum 2; (R. 25, 32.) The Amended Information 
is identical to the City's initial Information except that "a Class C misdemeanor" is 
replaced with "an Infraction." See Addendum 2; (R. 32.) The Amended Information also 
references § 41-6-46, U.C.A., for its authority. 
The City entirely ignored § 41-6-16, U.C.A., even though this particular Code 
section was expressly brought to the City's attention in Caree's Motion for Jury Trial. 
See (R. 36-40.) This Code section governs the provisions of Chapter 6, Title 41: 
The provisions of this chapter are applicable and uniform throughout 
this state and in all of its political subdivisions and municipalities. A 
local authority may not enact or enforce any rule or ordinance in conflict 
with the provisions of this chapter. Local authorities may, however, adopt 
ordinances consistent with this chapter, and additional traffic ordinances 
which are not in conflict with this chapter. 
§ 41-6-16, U.C.A. (emphasis added). 
Section 41-6-16 is clear and unambiguous. The City is not permitted to "enact or 
enforce any rule or ordinance in conflict with the provisions of § 41-6-12, U.C.A., which 
defines the penalty for a violation of § 41-6-46, U.C.A., as a "Class C misdemeanor." 
SeeAllgoodv. Larson, 545 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 1976); Richfield City v. Walker, 
790 P.2d 87, 90 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("penalty portion of an ordinance is void if it 
2
 The City never petitioned the trial court nor filed a motion for permission to amend its Information, 
although Rule 4(d), Utah R. Cr. P., expressly governs the procedure for amending an information. 
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conflicts with the general state law governing the subject"). 
Jn Allgood, the court concluded that cities may not exceed the "public policy 
declared by the legislature." See Allgood, 545 P.2d 530 at 532. The Allgood court also 
concluded that the treatise, McQuillin, correctly states Utah law: 
If the ordinance penalty conflicts with that of the general law of the 
State covering the same subject, the ordinance penalty is void. 
5 McQuillin, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §17.15 at 326 (3d Ed.) 
In the instant case, the City's actions, changing the penalty from that set by 
§41-6-12, directly conflicts with State law. Moreover, even without the provisions of 
§ 41-6-16, which expressly forbids the City from actions which are inconsistent with the 
provisions of Chapter 6 of Title 41, the City is prohibited from setting a different penalty 
for speeding, since the State has expressly enacted laws covering the subject of speeding 
and setting forth the penalties for speeding violations. See 5 McQuillin, MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATIONS §17.15 at 326 (3d Ed.) 
II. The trial court abused its discretion in permitting the City to amend its initial 
Information because the trial court failed to follow and hold the City to the 
provisions of Rule 4(d), Utah R. Cr. P.< and because such amendment prejudiced 
Careers right to a trial by jury. 
Rule 4(d), Utah R. Cr. P., governs amendments to an information: 
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be prosecuted 
by indictment or information sworn to by a person having reason to 
believe the offense has been committed.... 
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(d) The court may permit an indictment or information to be 
amended at any time before verdict if no additional or different 
offense is charged and the substantial rights of the defendant are not 
prejudiced.... 
Rule 4(d), UtahR. Cr. P. 
It is well established that Caree's right to a jury trial is a substantial right. See 
State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297-98 (Utah 1986) (a "criminal defendant's right to a jury 
trial is substantial and valuable and should be carefully safeguarded by our courts"). In 
Cook, the court also concluded that: 
Had defendant been tried before a jury, the prosecution's failure to 
prove the offense charged might have resulted in an acquittal [rather 
than merely failing to prove the felony]. Id. at 298. 
In the instant case, had Caree been tried before a jury, Caree might have been acquitted. 
Therefore, Caree's right to a jury trial is clearly substantial. 
Caree timely filed her demand for a jury trial. (R. 25.) Two weeks after filing her 
demand, the City amended its Information without petitioning the trial court for 
permission, (R. 32.), which effectively denied Caree her statutory right to a trial by jury. 
The trial court never discussed Rule 4(d) nor the prejudice to Caree caused by the City's 
Amended Information. The trial court's actions were clearly in error where the City's 
Amended Information effectively eliminated Caree's statutory right to a trial by jury. 
Moreover, the City's purpose in amending its Information was for the sole purpose of 
denying Caree a jury trial. 
- 1 8 -
III. Even if, arguendo, the City could reduce the penalty from a Class C 
misdemeanor to an Infraction, the trial court erred in denying Caree a trial by 
jury because Utah's Constitution guarantees to Caree a right to a trial by jury* 
Utah's Constitution grants to every citizen, including Caree, the right to a trial by 
jury. Sections 10 and 12 and Amendment VII provide Caree's right to a trial by jury: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel, [and] to have a speedy public trial 
by an impartial jury . . . . 
UTAH CONST. § 12 (emphasis added). 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. . 
A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded. 
UTAH CONST. § 10 (emphasis added). 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall 
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, 
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any 
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the 
common law. 
UTAH CONST., Amendment VII (emphasis added). 
Utah Code Annotated also generally reaffirms Caree's right to a trial by jury. If 
Caree's alleged violation is deemed to be criminal, § 77-1-6, U.C.A., applies: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, [and] to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury . . . . 
§ 77-l-6(l)(f), U.C.A. (emphasis added). 
If Caree's alleged violation is deemed to be civil, § 78-21-6, U.C.A., applies: 
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In actions for the recovery of specific real or personal property, 
with or without damages, or for money claimed as due upon contract 
or as damages for breach of contract, or for injuries, an issue of fact 
may be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived or a reference is 
ordered. 
§ 78-21-6, U.C.A. (emphasis added). 
Utah's Constitution does not limit Careers right to a trial by jury, regardless of 
whether the charges against Caree are characterized as criminal or civil. The Constitution 
contains no express language nor any intent to carve out a distinct class of court actions 
that is separate from "criminal" or "civil." Therefore, an "Infraction" must either be 
classified as criminal or civil; there is no middle ground.3 Assume, arguendo, that the 
City was within its power and authority to change the penalty portion of its Information 
to an Infraction. The action against Caree must be deemed criminal or civil. Regardless 
of which classification is applicable, Caree is entitled to a trial by jury as granted by 
Utah's Constitution: Sections 10 and 12, Amendment VII. 
Whereas § 77-l-6(l)(f), U.C.A., places no limits on Caree's right to a trial "by an 
impartial jury," § 77-l-6(2)(e) allows a conviction for an "infraction" without a jury: 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon 
a plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by 
jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a 
magistrate. 
§ 77-l-6(l)(f), U.CA. 
3
 Utah's Code provides a one-sentence designation for offenses: "Offenses are designated as 
felonies, misdemeanors, or infractions." § 76-3-102, U.CA. From this Code section, it can be logically 
inferred that infractions are classified as "criminal" violations. 
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Rule 17(d), Utah R. Cr. P., goes further: 
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the 
defendant makes written demand at least ten days prior to trial, or 
the court orders otherwise. No jury shall be allowed in the trial of an 
infraction. 
Rule 17(d), UtahR. Cr. P. 
Yet, the Code does not expressly define an infraction as criminal or civil, except by 
inference.4 Thus, subsection (2)(e) of § 77-1-6 places a limitation on the right granted in 
subsection (l)(f) merely by creating a new classification, "Infraction," without any 
constitutional basis. Rule 17(d) is even more explicit. Section 77-l-6(2)(e), U.C.A., and 
Rule 17(d), Utah R. Cr. P., therefore, impermissibly limit Caree's right to a trial by jury 
where the Constitution places no such limitations. The Constitution must trump the Code 
and the Rule. 
IV. The trial court abused its discretion in (1) denying a hearing on Careers Motion 
for Jury Trial on a date prior to the trial, or (2) denying her a continuance after 
denying her Motion because such denial substantially prejudiced her. 
On the same day that Caree was informed by the trial court that she was no longer 
entitled to a jury trial,5 Caree filed her Motion for Jury Trial. (R. 36-42.) She also 
requested the trial court to set a hearing prior to the day of trial. Id. However, the trial 
court refused to set a hearing prior to the date of trial. 
4
 See Footnote 3, supra. 
5
 On May 22, 1996, Caree filed her demand for a jury trial pursuant to Rule 17(d). On June 7, 1996, 
the City filed its Amended Information and changed the penalty to an infraction, thereby eliminating Caree's 
right to a jury trial. 
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Since the trial court must have a pool of jurors ready for jury trials, the trial court 
had, in effect, made its decision to deny Caree's Motion for Jury Trial prior to hearing. 
Otherwise, the trial court would have provided for sufficient time between the date of 
hearing and the date of trial in the event the trial court granted Caree's motion. 
It is true that had the trial court granted Caree's Motion for Jury Trial, the trial court 
could have then granted itself a continuance to assemble a jury. By the same token, the 
trial court, with slight burden, could also have granted Caree a continuance when it 
denied her Motion for Jury Trial. Whatever inconvenience the trial court or the City 
might experience from a continuance to assemble a jury is the same inconvenience, if 
any, created by granting Caree a continuance. Yet, the trial court was, if it had not pre-
judged Caree's motion, quite willing to be put in a position where it would have to grant 
a continuance for itself upon granting Caree's motion. 
The trial court's abuse of discretion prejudiced Caree in two ways: (1) Caree's 
opportunity to negotiate for or accept a plea was foreclosed; and (2) Caree's trial 
preparation was geared to presenting her case to a jury and where the trial court failed to 
allow time for Caree to adjust her trial strategy. 
V. The trial court abused its discretion in imposing a penalty on Caree that 
substantially exceeds the Uniform Fine/Bail schedule without finding any 
aggravating factors because such abuse has a chilling effect on Caree's right to 
trial and obviously prejudiced her. 
The trial court abused is discretion by imposing a total fine of $60.00 plus $30.00 
and attendance at a safety driving school. (R. 44-45, 47, 77.) Appendix C, CJA, sets 
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forth the uniform Fine/Bail schedule, incorporated herein as Addendum 4. For speeding 
11-20 miles per hour over the speed limit, the Schedule sets a fine of $50.00. See 
Addendum 4. 
An abuse of discretion may be manifest if the actions of the trial court were 
inherently unfair or if the trial court imposed an excessive fine. See State v. Russell, 791 
P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1990) (citing State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986); 
State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887-88 (Utah 1978). 
By imposing a greater fine than a defendant would ordinarily pay if he or she pleads 
nolo contendere or guilty, the trial court has cast a chilling net over those who may want 
to go to trial. Since Caree has a fundamental right to a jury trial, any effort by the trial 
court to undermine or curtail that right through intimidation or threat of an enhanced 
penalty is an abuse of the trial court's discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The City's Amended Information is in direct conflict with State Law where State 
Law expressly prohibits the City from setting a penalty different than that proscribed by 
State Law for a speeding violation. Further, since the City's Amended Information 
prejudiced a substantial right of Caree, namely her right to a trial by jury, the trial court 
abused its discretion in permitting the City to amend its information. 
But even if the City could change the penalty portion of § 41-6-12, U.C.A., to an 
infraction, Utah's Constitution guarantees Caree a trial by jury, notwithstanding Utah's 
Code section that limits jury trials to felonies, misdemeanors, and all civil cases. Utah's 
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Constitution does not contemplate a category of court actions different than "criminal" or 
"civil." An infraction is an enigma that is created solely by Utah's Code and with no 
support from Utah's Constitution. 
The trial court also abused its discretion by refusing to set a hearing on Caree's 
Motion for Jury Trial on a date prior to the date of trial. The burden for the trial court to 
hold a hearing on Caree's motion was slight, if any. The prejudice to Caree by not 
holding a hearing on a date prior to trial denied Caree a right to accept the City 
Prosecutor's plea, which was withdrawn the day prior to the date of trial. Once the trial 
court denied Caree's motion, it again abused its discretion by not granting a requested 
continuance. Such continuance would have been required if the trial court had granted 
Caree's motion because the trial court would need to assemble a jury pool. Moreover, 
Caree was prejudiced by the trial court's denial because she was not permitted to accept 
the City's plea and was not provided time to adjust her trial strategy. 
The Court of Appeals should reverse the judgments of the trial court, order a new 
trial with a jury, if Caree so desires, and order the trial court to disallow the City's 
attempt to amend its Information. In addition, and partly in the alternative, the Court of 
Appeals should, in the interests of justice, dismiss the charges against Caree. 
DATED this 23rd day of June 1997. 
^f/ / i^aQ^~-— 
Michael A. Jensen / / 
Counsel for Caree F.UcfcDonald, Defendant/Appellant 
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Keith L. Stoney (3868) 
David L. Clark (6199) 
West Valley City Prosecutor's 
3600 Constitution Boulevard 
West Valley City, UT 84119 
(801) 963-3331 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH (WVC) 
Plaintiff, 
v. : 
MCDONALD, CAREE F. : 
4 360 WEST BENVIEW DRIVE : 
WEST VALLEY CITY, UTAH 84120 : 
Defendant. : 
: I N F O R M A T I O N 
: Case No. 969002082 
The undersigned, DAVID L. CLARK, under oath, states on 
information and belief that the defendant, on or about 6 JANUARY 
1996, at the vicinity of 3300 WEST 4100 SOUTH, West Valley City, 
Utah, did unlawfully commit the crime(s) of: 
COUNT 1: SPEEDING, a Class "C" Misdemeanor, 41-6-46, U.C.A. 1953, 
as amended, by operating a motor vehicle at a speed of dt 
least 11 MPH over the posted limit. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the 
following witnesses: 
SGT MCLACHLAN 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiant bases this information on the following: 
Tab 2 
Keith L. Stoney (3868) 
City Prosecutor 
West Valley City 
3600 Constitution Boulevard 
West Valley City, UT 84119 
(801) 963-3331 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH (WVC) 
Plaintiff, j 
V . J 
MCDONALD, CAREE F. ; 
436 0 WEST BENVIEW DRIVE : 
WEST VALLEY CITY, UTAH 84120 : 
Defendant. 
: A M E N D E D 
: I N F O R M A T I O N 
: Case No. 969002082 
The undersigned, DAVID L. CLARK, under oath, states on 
information and belief that the defendant, on or about 6 JANUARY 
1996, at the vicinity of 3300 WEST 4100 SOUTH, West Valley City, 
Utah, did unlawfully commit the crime(s) of; 
COUNT 1: SPEEDING, an "Infraction", 41-6-46, U.C.A. 1953, as 
amended, by operating a motor vehicle at a speed of at 
least 11 MPH over the posted limit. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the 
following witnesses: 
SGT MCLACHLAN 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 



























IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEST VALLEY CITY DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY CITY, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
v. ) Case No. 969002082 
CAREE MCDONALD, ) 
Defendant. ) 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE CARLOS A. ESQUEDA 
June 20, 1996 





























A P P E A R A N C E S 
John Huber 
Assistant West Valley City Prosecutor 
West Valley City 
3600 Constitution Blvd. 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
Michael A. Jensen 
Attorney at Law 
900 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1655 
1 June 20, 1996 
2 PROCEEDINGS 
3 
4 THE COURT: Go ahead Mr. Jensen. 
5 MR. JENSEN: Your Honor, there is a statute that very clearly states that this 
6 speeding ordinance shall be uniform and no municipality may enact or enforce any rule, or 
7 ordinance in conflict with the provisions. And the provisions are very clear that it's a Class 
8 C misdemeanor. Secondly, in a more recent case of Richfield City, in which case, by the 
9 way, the city was promoting a Class B misdemeanor and the State was also Class B 
10 misdemeanor. But the court held that a penalty portion of an ordinance is void if it conflicts 
11 with the general State law governing the subject. Now, it doesn't invalidate the ordinance 
12 when the city has an ordinance in which the penalty portion is different from the State, but 
13 the penalty portion is clearly void. There are other cases that I can cite as well, that was a 
14 Court of Appeals case, 1990. There is also a 1976 Supreme Court case which says basically 
15 the same thing: Allgood v. Larson, said the same thing. If the ordinance penalty conflicts 
16 with that of the general law of the State covering the same subject, the ordinance penalty is 
17 void. I don't believe that the prosecutor can unilaterally just change that, and particularly 
18 change its ordinance for the express purpose of avoiding jury trial, Your Honor. Do you 
19 have any questions on that? 
20 THE COURT: I have no questions of you, Mr. Jensen. Mr. Huber, do you 
21 have any response to Mr. Jensen's argument? 
22 MR. HUBER: Your Honor, (inaudible) specifically (inaudible) 
23 THE COURT: Well, specifically what he just enunciated in court today that 
24 you're abusing your discretion, that the city has no authority in which to amend charges 
25 down if it conflicts with the sentencing statutes in accordance with the Utah Code 
4 
1 Annotated of state law. 
2 MR. HUBER: The city's response is that the prosecutors should have at their 
3 discretion the ability to amend a charge lower, to notch it down. We don't have the 
4 discretion to notch it up. In other words, we couldn't have charged the defendant with a 
5 Class B in this case. Our position is that we can amend that down. The city's interest is 
6 | we don't have the desire to give the defendant the possibility, however slim, of facing jail 
7 time; and we believe we have the discretion in prosecuting to represent those interests in not 
8 trying to seek a penalty that has the possibility of jail time. In summary, Your Honor, our 
9 position is that the prosecutors do have the discretion to amend the charge to a lower 
10 degree, but not to a higher degree. 
11 THE COURT: Your response to that, Mr. Jensen. 
12 MR. JENSEN: Yes, Your Honor. I think it's all good if the city's intent really 
13 was to reduce the penalty by reducing and taking away jail time. But, it's clear from their 
14 actions that the city has taken here that they didn't do that until we requested a jury trial. 
15 So their sole motivation in this case wasn't the issue of jail time, it was simply to eliminate 
16 the jury trial. So, it's a little bit deceptive to talk about jail time because that was never an 
17 issue in this case and it hasn't been done except in those cases where a jury trial has been 
18 requested, Your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: It could be an issue if the case is remaining as a Class C 
20 misdemeanor because the maximum sentence is 90 days in jail and a $750 fine, would you 
21 agree? 
22 MR. JENSEN: I absolutely agree. All I'm talking about is the motivation of the 
23 city in doing that. The motivation wasn't the jail time. The motivation was to remove the 
24 access to a jury trial. That's all I have. 
25 THE COURT: Thank you. I'm going to deny the defense motion in regards to 
5 
1 this case. I believe that the city prosecutor, as well as any prosecutor within the state, has 
2 the power and the authority in which to amend down any charge when they feel the facts 
3 substantiate that. I don't believe the city's motives, I don't question the city's motives. It's 
4 within their complete discretion to do so. I previously ruled on that. Mr. Jensen, I'm going 
5 to deny your motion as I previously have in your other cases. Where do we rest? Do we 
6 need to put this trial on today? 
7 MR. JENSEN: Your Honor, why don't I make a motion to continue this in 
8 order so I have time to talk to my client to see if we want to, now that there's not a jury 
9 trial available, to see whether or not they want to take the plea bargain instead. 
10 THE COURT: Talk to your client and see if they're willing to take the plea 
11 bargain. I'm not willing to continue the case. 
12 MR. HUBER: At this time, I believe that Mr. Jensen has been informed earlier 
13 that if his client wished to take our offer, that we have to do that the day before the trial 
14 because we have taken great efforts to prepare this trial and we're ready to proceed. We 
15 withdraw that plea offer. So, I think choice is to proceed or plead guilty. 
16 MR. JENSEN: Your Honor, that was never communicated, and besides this 
17 whole issue was predicated on whether there was a jury trial. 
18 THE COURT: Well, Mr. Jensen, I'm going to disagree with you cause we've 
19 gone through this before and I told you last time that if you're going to run these kind of 
20 issues, these kind of motions, that we're going to put the trial on. Frankly, I'm willing to 
21 give you another chance, but apparently, the prosecution isn't willing to offer those plea 
22 bargains today. Is that correct, Mr. Huber? 
23 MR. HUBER: Yes, Your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: So, we're either going - Ms. McDonald either has a choice of 



























want time to talk it over with Ms. McDonald? 
MR. JENSEN: Well, I'm not clear. You're saying that there is no plea bargain. 
THE COURT: That's right. The offer is plead guilty today or we'll put the trial 
on. 
MR. JENSEN: That's sort of no choice, is it? 
THE COURT: No, that is a choice. Do you not understand the question, Mr. 
Jensen? Does your client want to present evidence today and have the trial— 
MR. JENSEN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Or is she willing or does she want to enter a guilty plea 
considering the city prosecutor has just rescinded their offers? 
MR. JENSEN: We do, Your Honor. We would like to preserve the Court's 
Order then denying a jury trial for appeal purposes. 
THE COURT: I didn't deny your jury trial. I found that there was no basis in 
your motion, which states that the prosecution has no authority to amend down the charge. 
MR. JENSEN: We would just like to preserve that for appeal, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Under my words, yes. Under your's, no. That's not an accurate 
statement of my ruling. My ruling isn't denying your client a jury trial. My ruling is, in my 
opinion, under the laws of this State, that the city has the authority to amend down their 
information, which they properly did. 
MR. JENSEN: That's fine, but, I mean, I just want to preserve that. 
THE COURT: That's on the record, Mr. Jensen. Now back to my original 
question. Are you prepared to proceed to trial or is your client going to enter a guilty plea 
today? 
MR. JENSEN: We're ready, we're ready, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. We'll do one sentencing prior to this and that's 
1 [The proceedings were temporarily diverted to another case] 
2 I [The trial followed after the temporary diversion] 
3 
5 
6 I [Following the trial, the Court rendered its verdict as follows, followed by 
7 I sentencing] 
8 
9 I THE COURT: The most convincing evidence came from Ms. McDonald's own 
10 words in that she probably did not look at the 40 m.p.h. sign. If she probably did not look 
11 at the 40 m.p.h. sign, she probably did not look at the posted sign that warns her and gives 
12 her notice that photo radar is about to be used; and you ought to slow down and make sure 
13 your speed is 40 m.p.h. She doesn't believe that she is speeding. She doesn't recall if she 
14 was speeding. She doesn't state in her testimony that she specifically looked at her 
15 speedometer and noted that she was doing 40 m.p.h. on 4100 South. Based upon that 
16 testimony, I find Miss McDonald guilty of speeding, an infraction. Do you wish sentence to 
17 be imposed today, Mr. Jensen? 
18 MR. JENSEN: Yes, Your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: Is there anything you want to tell me before I impose sentence, 
20 Mr. Jensen? 
21 MR. JENSEN: Ms. McDonald has a clean record, never had a violation, at least 
22 in the last five years to her memory (inaudible). 
23 THE COURT: Miss McDonald, is there anything you want to add before I 
24 impose sentence? 
25 MS. MCDONALD: No. 
8 
1 I THE COURT; Mr. Huber, any recommendations from the city? 
2 MR. HUBER: No, judge. 
3 THE COURT: I think the problem here, as with all speeding tickets, is that 
4 when we all get a speeding ticket, and I dare to say that if there is anyone in this court room 
5 that hasn't received a speeding ticket, that's amazing and congratulations to you, because 
6 I've been a victim of a speeding ticket myself. I don't like it. I don't personally think it's 
7 fair, simply because, why should I get caught when everyone else is doing it? Why doesn't 
8 everybody get caught? Well, in a perfect world, we wouldn't need speed limits. We would 
9 all drive carefully. We wouldn't need laws. Well, Miss McDonald, on this occasion you 
10 got caught. It doesn't mean you're a terrible driver. It doesn't mean you're a terrible 
11 person. It just means that on a particular day, January 6, 1996, you were speeding. It's as 
12 simple as that. Based upon that, I'm going to impose a $60.00 fine. I ask that you go to 
13 traffic school and to provide proof of that within the next 45 days. How long do you need 
14 to pay the $60.00 fine? 
15 MS. MCDONALD: 30 days. 
16 THE COURT: Okay, one month to pay the $60.00 fine. Please see the court 
17 J Ms. McDonald before you leave. 
18 











MPH Over Speed 
Limit 
0-10 MPH 40.00 40.00 
11-15 MPH 50.00 50.00 
16-20 MPH 60.00 60.00 
21-25 MPH 80.00 80.00 
26-30 MPH 100.00 100.00 
31-35 MPH 120.00 120.00 
36-40 MPH 140.00 140.00 
For speeding 
offenses in 
school zone add: 20.00 
41+MPH 300.00 
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Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In capital cases the 
jury shall consist of twelve persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of 
no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature shall establish the number of 
jurors by statute, but in no event shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In 
criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors 
may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to 
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his 
own behalf, to have a speedy public trial'by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. 
In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance 
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled 
to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for 
the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function 
of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless 
otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of 
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any 
preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by 
statute or rule. 
A M E N D M E N T VII 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, 
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise 
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common 
law. 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED; 
41-6-12. Violations of chapter - Penalties. 
(1) A violation of any provision of this chapter is a class C misdemeanor, unless 
otherwise provided. 
(2) A violation of any provision of Articles 2, 11, 15, and 17 of this chapter is an 
infraction, unless otherwise provided. 
41-6-16. Uniform application of chapter - Effect of local ordinances. 
The provisions of this chapter are applicable and uniform throughout this state and 
in all of its political subdivisions and municipalities. A local authority may not enact or 
enforce any rule or ordinance in conflict with the provisions of this chapter. Local 
authorities may, however, adopt ordinances consistent with this chapter, and additional 
traffic ordinances which are not in conflict with this chapter. 
41-6-46. Speed regulations 
(1) A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and 
prudent under the existing conditions, giving regard to the actual and potential hazards 
then existing, including when: 
(a) approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing; 
(b) approaching and going around a curve; 
(c) approaching a hill crest; 
(d) traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway; and 
(e) special hazards exist due to pedestrians, other traffic, weather, or highway 
conditions. 
(2) If no special hazard exists, and subject to Subsection (4) and Sections 41-6-47 
and 41-6-48, the following speeds are lawful: 
(a) 20 miles per hour in a reduced speed school zone as defined in Section 
41-6-20.1; 
(b) 25 miles per hour in any urban district; and 
(c) 55 miles per hour in other locations. 
(3) Except as provided in Section 41-6-48.5, any speed in excess of the limits 
provided in this section or established under Section 41-6-47 or 41-6-48, is prima facie 
evidence that the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful. 
(4) The governor by proclamation in time of war or emergency may change the 
speed limits on the highways of the state. 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED: 
76-3-102. Designation of offenses. 
Offenses are designated as felonies, misdemeanors, or infractions. 
76-3-105. Infractions. 
(1) Infractions are not classified. 
(2) Any offense which is an infraction within this code is expressly designated 
and any offense defined outside this code which is not designated as a felony 
or misdemeanor and for which no penalty is specified is an infraction. 
77-1-6. Rights of defendant. 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in his 
behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district 
where the offense is alleged to have been committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be entitled 
to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail and if the 
business of the court permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to advance 
money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or the laws 
of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a 
husband against his wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a plea of 
guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by jury has 
been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a magistrate. 
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78-21-1. Right to jury trial. 
In actions for the recovery of specific real or personal property, with or without 
damages, or for money claimed as due upon contract or as damages for breach of 
contract, or for injuries, an issue of fact may be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is 
waived or a reference is ordered. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
Rule 4. Prosecution of public offenses. 
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be prosecuted by indictment or 
information sworn to by a person having reason to believe the offense has been 
committed. 
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the offense for which the defendant is 
being prosecuted by using the name given to the offense by common law or by statute or 
by stating in concise terms the definition of the offense sufficient to give the defendant 
notice of the charge. An information may contain or be accompanied by a statement of 
facts sufficient to make out probable cause to sustain the offense charged where 
appropriate. Such things as time, place, means, intent, manner, value and ownership need 
not be alleged unless necessary to charge the offense. Such things as money, securities, 
written instruments, pictures, statutes and judgments may be described by any name or 
description by which they are generally known or by which they may be identified 
without setting forth a copy. However, details concerning such things may be obtained 
through a bill of particulars. Neither presumptions of law nor matters of judicial notice 
need be stated. 
(c) The court may strike any surplus or improper language from an indictment or 
information. 
(d) The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended at any time 
before verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the substantial rights of 
the defendant are not prejudiced. After verdict, an indictment or information may be 
amended so as to state the offense with such particularity as to bar a subsequent 
prosecution for the same offense upon the same set of facts. 
(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are required to inform a 
defendant of the nature and cause of the offense charged, so as to enable him to prepare 
his defense, the defendant may file a written motion for a bill of particulars. The motion 
shall be filed at arraignment or within ten days thereafter, or at such later time as the 
court may permit. The court may, on its own motion, direct the filing of a bill of 
particulars. A bill of particulars may be amended or supplemented at any time subject to 
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such conditions as justice may require. The request for and contents of a bill of 
particulars shall be limited to a statement of factual information needed to set forth the 
essential elements of the particular offense charged. 
(f) An indictment or information shall not be held invalid because any name 
contained therein may be incorrectly spelled or stated. 
(g) It shall not be necessary to negate any exception, excuse or proviso contained in 
the statute creating or defining the offense. 
(h) Words and phrases used are to be construed according to their usual meaning 
unless they are otherwise defined by law or have acquired a legal meaning. 
(i) Use of the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive shall not invalidate the 
indictment or information. 
(j) The names of witnesses on whose evidence an indictment or information was 
based shall be endorsed thereon before it is filed. Failure to endorse shall not affect the 
validity but endorsement shall be ordered by the court on application of the defendant. 
Upon request the prosecuting attorney shall, except upon a showing of good cause, 
furnish the names of other witnesses he proposes to call whose names are not so 
endorsed. 
(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue directing it to appear 
before the magistrate. Appearance may be by an officer or counsel. Proceedings against a 
corporation shall be the same as against a natural person. 
Rule 17. The trial. 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in person and 
by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at the trial with the following 
exceptions: 
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may consent 
in writing to trial in his absence; 
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendants 
voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for 
trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment 
entered therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been 
present; and 
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good cause 
shown which may include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous conduct. 
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal attendance of the 
defendant at the trial. 
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried in the following order: 
(1) misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody; 
(2) felony cases when defendant is in custody; 
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(3) felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance; and 
(4) misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance. 
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a jury in open 
court with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution. 
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes written 
demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise. No jury shall be 
allowed in the trial of an infraction. 
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall be as specified in Section 
78-46-5, U.C.A. 1953. 
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the consent of the accused and 
the approval of the court, by stipulation in writing or made orally in open court, proceed 
to trial or complete a trial then in progress with any number of jurors less than otherwise 
required. 
(g) After the jury has been impanelled and sworn, the trial shall proceed in the 
following order: 
(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated; 
(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement and the defense 
may make an opening statement or reserve it until the prosecution has 
rested; 
(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge; 
(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case; 
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the court, 
for good cause, otherwise permits; 
(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time, the 
court shall instruct the jury; and 
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on both sides 
without argument, the prosecution shall open the argument, the defense 
shall follow and the prosecution may close by responding to the defense 
argument. The court may set reasonable limits upon the argument of 
counsel for each party and the time to be allowed for argument. 
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an alternate juror 
has been selected, the case shall proceed using the alternate juror. If no alternate has been 
selected, the parties may stipulate to proceed with the number of jurors remaining. 
Otherwise, the jury shall be discharged and a new trial ordered. 
(i) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to view the place in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, or in which any other material fact 
occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body under the charge of an officer to 
the place, which shall be shown to them by some person appointed by the court for that 
purpose. The officer shall be sworn that while the jury are thus conducted, he will suffer 
no person other than the person so appointed to speak to them nor to do so himself on any 
subject connected with the trial and to return them into court without unnecessary delay 
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or at a specified time. 
(j) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to separate or are 
sequestered, they shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty not to converse 
among themselves or to converse with, or suffer themselves to be addressed by, any other 
person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their duty not to form or express an 
opinion thereon until the case is finally submitted to them. 
(k) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the instructions of the 
court and all exhibits and papers which have been received as evidence, except 
depositions; and each juror may also take with him any notes of the testimony or other 
proceedings taken by himself, but none taken by any other person. 
(1) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept together in some 
convenient place under charge of an officer until they agree upon a verdict or are 
discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except by order of the court, the 
officer having them under his charge shall not allow any communication to be made to 
them, or make any himself, except to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and 
he shall not, before the verdict is rendered, communicate to any person the state of their 
deliberations or the verdict agreed upon. 
(m) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed on any 
point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge of them, who 
shall communicate such request to the court. The court may then direct that the jury be 
brought before the court where, in the presence of the defendant and both counsel, the 
court shall respond to the inquiry or advise the jury that no further instructions shall be 
given. Such response shall be recorded. The court may in its discretion respond to the 
inquiry in writing without having the jury brought before the court, in which case the 
inquiry and the response thereto shall be entered in the record. 
(n) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face, it may be corrected by 
the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out again. 
(o) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all 
the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information or indictment, or 
any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not legally sufficient to establish 
the offense charged therein or any lesser included offense. 
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: 
Rule 38. Jury trial of right. 
(a) Right preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by the constitution or as 
given by statute shall be preserved to the parties. 
(b) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a 
jury by paying the statutory jury fee and serving upon the other parties a demand therefor 
in writing at any time after the commencement of the action and not later than 10 days 
after the service of the last pleading directed to such issue. Such demand may be endorsed 
upon a pleading of the party. 
(c) Same: Specification of issues. In his demand a party may specify the issues 
which he wishes so tried; otherwise he shall be deemed to have demanded trial by jury 
for all the issues so triable. If he has demanded trial by jury for only some of the issues, 
any other party, within 10 days after service of the demand or such lesser time as the 
court may order, may serve a demand for trial by jury of any other or all of the issues of 
fact in the action. 
(d) Waiver. The failure of a party to pay the statutory fee, to serve a demand as 
required by this rule and to file it as required by Rule 5(d) constitutes a waiver by him of 
trial by jury. A demand for trial by jury made as herein provided may not be withdrawn 
without the consent of the parties. 
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